Flight Safety and the B-58

We think it's time to set the record straight about the flight safety record of the B-58 Hustler. After reading some misinformed and even biased reports about the B-58, it occurs to us that there is a lot of incorrect information and speculation being presented as fact. Articles and other publications that have referred to the Hustler as "accident prone", "hard to fly", or "hard to maintain" without citing any supporting evidence for these claims misrepresent this airplane and do an injustice to the history of the B-58 and the people who participated in the program, most of whom strongly supported the aircraft.

At the outset, we would like to make one thing clear: The B-58 was a dangerous airplane. It was dangerous to the Soviet Union and also to the American test pilots and USAF servicemen who flew and maintained them. But considering the radical advance in aviation technology and performance it represented, the Hustler was actually less dangerous than some airplanes that one can reasonably use for comparison.

Unsafe at any speed?

The sometimes-used explanation for the premature cancellation of the B-58 program due to flight safety is not supported by actions of the U.S. Air Force before or since the B-58 program ended. The primary support for this argument seems to be the accident rate itself. The reader is led to believe that since some aircraft were lost, it would be logical for the USAF to cancel the program. Yet a closer look at the history of the USAF indicates that support for programs with marginal safety records frequently continued as long as the chances for acheiving the mission goals appeared good, and the need for the capability the program offered continued to be a priority for the USAF.

For example, the F-117 stealth attack aircraft had a number of developmental problems including the crash of both prototypes, yet the promise of acheiving the goals of the program led the USAF to authorize the continuation of the Nighthawk program even while no aircraft actually existed to replace the destroyed prototypes. The capability to evade radar seemed attainable with the program and the need for this capability continued, so the support for the mission, and therefore the program was there. The safety record does not generally determine the fate of a given program while in the developmental stage unless the likelihood of attaining program goals is lacking or the need for the capability no longer exists.

At time of program cancellation, the Hustler was operational, the early developmental problems were resolved, and it enjoyed a vastly-improved operational safety record compared to the development cycle safety record. Half of all the Hustlers lost to accidents were lost before the airplane became operational, reflecting the research and development necessary to create a new generation of bomber over twice as fast as its predecessors. The airplane delivered the performance outlined in the program goals and had in fact set a number of performance records, clearly demonstrating it could fulfill the mission. As far as the mission changing, it seems probable that some of the crystal ball gazers at the Pentagon may have believed manned bombers would be replaced by ICBMs, but the XB-70 and later the F-111/FB-111 programs indicated the continuing need and desire for a supersonic bomber. Meanwhile, the Soviets also worked at breakneck pace to get the Tupelov Tu-22M Backfire supersonic bomber operational, as they did not feel the mission was obsolete.

So why did the B-58 program end? We believe the program likely had detractors in high places, and this is the simple explanation for the end of the B-58. Powerful people in the Pentagon were able to convince Secretary of Defense McNamara that the program should be cancelled and superseded by newer programs such as the XB-70, which competed with the B-58 for funding. Some ongoing problems with cooling the advanced (for the time) B-58 computer systems were not solved to the satisfaction of all concerned, and that may have been a secondary factor. But politics as usual probably had as much to do with the cancellation as anything else.

Ultimately, the Hustler was retired early due to lack of Pentagon and White House support. President Nixon even authorized the order to scrap the surviving Hustlers just seven years after they left service. Other aircraft were kept around much longer after they left service (some even reactivating to service), causing one to speculate as to what was the hurry to scrap the remaining Hustlers? The cancellation of the program left many unanswered questions and certainly left a black mark on the Hustler's legacy, at least among the uninformed. But the "political agenda" theory of the demise of the B-58 is certainly compatible with the early scrapping of the remaining Hustlers.

Let's look at the actual safety record of the B-58 Hustler.

Finding a basis for safety record comparison

Our first step must be to find some similar programs that can provide a basis for comparison.

It would be unfair and uninformed to compare the safety records of the B-58 and the XB-70, for example. Even though both were supersonic bombers, only two XB-70s were built and fully 50% of them crashed. It should also be noted that the one XB-70 destroyed was involved in a mid-air collision, hardly a poor reflection on the airplane or design. But such a comparison is obviously meaningless since the XB-70 was in the developmental stage when cancelled. Since the likehood of the program succeeding appeared good, it is possible that the USAF desire for the capability dimished at some point.

Most aircraft enjoy an improving safety record as more time passes and more aircraft are built. For that reason, the comparison of the B-58 safety record to the B-52 or the B-47 is problematic due to the large numbers of B-52s and B-47s produced (well over 1,000 each), and the longevity of these programs.

The SR-71 and F-111 programs are better candidates for comparison because they were built in great enough numbers to account for the development cycle of a new aircraft yet did not enjoy the larger production numbers of the Boeing aircraft. Similar to the B-58, both programs have had problems with support from the Pentagon from time to time as well.

Not all accidents were due to some deficiency of the aircraft or its design. Some were pilot error or weather-related. It is assumed that the programs compared below also had multiple factors for their accident rate. This brief analysis does not attempt to dissect each accident, but rather to show that the overall numbers indicate that the Hustler was not more dangerous than the other envelope-expanding aircraft of the time.

Comparing B-58 and SR-71 Safety Records

The SR-71 program started with the A-12 and YF-12 series of aircraft. The XB-58A and YB-58A preceded the B-58A Hustler, with the TB-58A coming later. The programs were similar in many regards and indeed, some SR-71 crewmembers were former B-58 types. Both aircraft were high performance military aircraft designed for high altitude supersonic flight and penetration of Soviet Air Defenses. While you always run into the "apples vs. oranges" problems in such a comparison, we think this is a fair comparison, on balance. We included the A-12 and YF-12s in the statistics as both the XB-58A and YB-58A were always included in the Hustler's statistics. While the Blackbird's mission was different, we feel the safety records were comparable. The Blackbirds were certainly envelope-expanding aircraft. They were Mach 3-capable, a full 33% faster than the Hustler. The Hustler was at least 100% faster than previous bombers. Both aircraft pioneered new materials, power plants, and aerodynamics to achieve their mission.

Comparing B-58 and F-111 Safety Records

The F-111 program was generally thought to be the replacement for the B-58 Hustler. This aircraft was made in sufficient numbers to overcome the development problems associated with a new aircraft. While some say that it did not measure up to the promises of General Dynamics, it had enough government support to allow a significant number of aircraft to be built and to see service. It is hard to support the notion that it really was an envelope-expanding aircraft (which may account for its somewhat superior safety record), with performance somewhat inferior to the Hustler, but as previously stated, it was generally considered to be the replacement for the B-58 Hustler. It did help pioneer swing wing technology, so it was certainly a ground-breaking design from that standpoint.

Flight Safety Records

TYPE TOTAL
BUILT
# DESTROYED
IN ACCIDENTS
% DESTROYED
IN ACCIDENTS
Blackbird family
SR-71, A-12, YF-12
51 20 39%
Hustler family
B-58A, XB-58A, YB-58A
RB-58A, TB-58A
116 24 21%
Aardvark family
F-111A, RF-111A, EF-111A
F-111B, F-111C, F-111D,
F-111E, F-111F, FB-111A
FB-111B, F-111G, FB-111H
562 77 14%

Some sources state 26 Hustlers were destroyed in accidents, but the actual number was 24. Two others were damaged in accidents, one was repaired and flown after that, the other one never flew again but survives on static display. To our knowledge, all aircraft noted as destroyed in the above comparison were actually destroyed, not simply damaged in incidents.

Conclusions

These numbers would indicate that your odds of survival were somewhat better in a B-58 than an SR-71 but not as good as in an FB-111. Still, you do not hear about the SR-71 being "accident prone" or "hard to fly". This purpose of this comparison was not to disparage the well-deserved good reputation of the SR-71, but rather to point out that the Hustler was not a particularly unsafe airplane, given its mission.

In fact, all envelope-expanding military aircraft are inherently dangerous, and for those who sacrificed their lives and for their families, sadly these programs were no exceptions.

Information Sources

This comparison was constructed using airframe inventories available on the Internet.

Blackbirds.net
Blackbird Losses
F-111.net



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